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Abstract
This experiment was a first inquiry into the area of
excuses.
What excuses are is unclear, but evidence indi
cates (Jones & Berglas, 1978; Snyder, 1980) that people make
excuses in order to evade responsibility.
There has not
been any research that directly faces the question @To what
extent do people perceive and take into account excuses for
behavior?@ Excuses are usually thought to be environmental
factors (Austin, 1961) which can be cited as alternate
causes for the negative effects of an action.
The litera
ture concerning the fundamental attribution error (Ross,
1977; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Jones & Nisbett, 1972) indicates
that observers are unwilling to take into account situ
ational factors that may have influence on an actor.
An alternate explanation of this tendency to ignore environ
mental influences has been given by Harvey (1976) and Hamil
ton (1980).
It may be the case, they claim, that the
@threshold@ for the perception of environmental influence is
higher when subjects are deciding about the responsibility
of an actor than it is when the same subjects are deciding
about the causal antecedents of the effects of an actor’s
action.
This is because attribution of responsibility is
based on a more restrictive rule (@could have done otherwise@ for Hamilton, 1980, and perceived freedom to choose
the action for Harvey, 1976).
Both of these rules refer to
the strength of the environmental influence or excuse.
There are many different excuses, and one of the dimensions
that excuses, for the sake of this experiment, were assumed
to vary on was that of the internal or external locus of the
excuse.
Coercion is, presumably, an externally located
excuse, Insanity is a presumably internally located excuse,
while drug use is an excuse that has a questionable locus.
The perceived intention of the actor is another factor that
influences the perceived strength of the external influence
(Fincham & Jaspars, 1980).
For this reason, a 3(type of
excuse) x 2 (strength of excuse) x 2 (intention) factorial
design was used.
A control group was included in order to
assess the effect of the mere presence of an excuse.
Sub
jects watched a videotape in which a news announcer
described a murder scene in which Mike Johnson had shot sev
eral students of Central State University by firing at them
from a rooftop.
After the news announcement, the videotape
showed Mike engaged in a dialogue with his lawyer.
It was
during this dialogue that the manipulations of type of

vii

excuse, strength of excuse, and intent of the actor took
place.
The control subjects saw only the news announcement.
The intent manipulation was successful, but the success of
the strength manipulation was spotty, and not statistically
reliable.
There were no effects on attributed legal or
moral responsibility.
Nevertheless, there were significant
differences among the excuses on probability of conviction,
severity of recommended sentence, and prediction of the
future similar behavior on the part of the accused.
Coer
cion was the excuse that offered the most mitigation of
probability of conviction and severity of sentence.
Drugs
and Insanity were undifferentiated on these two measures.
Those subjects in the insane condition perceived the actor
as significantly more likely to commit a similar crime in
the future than those subjects in both the coercion and
drugs conditions.
These results combined indicate that the
external excuse (coercion) was the most effective excuse,
while the internaly located excuse (insanity) was used more
than the two others to predict future similar behavior.
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The Effects of Mitigating Circumstances on
Attributions of Responsibility

Excuses and Responsibility
1

The Effects of Mitigating Circumstances on
Attributions of Responsibility

"If someone, who
is plainly mad to all the
world, acts from an ordinary motive in the
perpetration of an offence, he is presumed to
have acted sanely, and with full capacity of
responsibility. No greater mistake could well
be made."
(Henry Maudsley* Responsibility in Men
tal Disease, 1897)

For as long as people have been accusing each other of
wrongful acts,
themselves)

people have been excusing each other

for their actions.

trist, Henry Maudsley,

(and

The great English psychia

rightly recognized that

somefactors

will change observers1 attitudes about responsibility.

By

identifying a motive or a desirable effect of an action, an
observer

can increase

his confidence

that

the

act

was

\

intended
excuse,

(Jones & Davis,

1965).

Or,

by

introducing an

an actor can presume to alter the balance between

personal causality and environmental (or impersonal) causal
ity

(Heider,

1958),

thus hopefully changing the

assigned

responsibility for the negative effects of the action (Jones
& Berglas,

1978).

Excuses are important not only because of

their widespread use by the layman, but also because the law
will accept certain excuses as valid mitigators of responsi-
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bility,

conviction,

and sanction.

For both these reasons,

it is suprising that excuses have been neglected in research
on the assignment of responsibility (Brewer, 1977; Fincham &
Jaspars,

1980).

There is, however, a long tradition of work on excuses
in philosophy (Anscombe, 1957; Austin,
Nowell-Smith,

1966;

Strawson, 1974).

cle dedicated exclusively to this

1961; Davidson,

1966;

In an important arti

subject, Austin

(1961)

states that excuses are used to deny responsibility for an
action by

relating extenuating circumstances that relieve

(if only partially) the actor from blame.
ing to Austin,

Excuses, accord

run the gamut from full pardon - "My arm was

bumped" - to little, if any, relief - "I’m so clumsy".
What exactly excuses are is unclear, and in part, this
paper is intended to explore this issue.

It might be better

to begin with a look at what people expect excuses to do and
to then speculate about common traits all excuses may share.
Excuses are made, Austin proposes, in order to evade respon
sibility.
las,

This proposition has been tested (Jones & Berg-

1978; Snyder,

1980) under the heading of "self-handi

capping strategies".
present

excuses

for

According to these
their

actions

-

authors,

sometimes

people

even

in

advance of their actions - in order to evade full responsi
bility.

For example,

hypochondriacs, when told that their
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performance on a task could be affected by their health,
reported significantly more health problems than hypochon
driacs who were told their health was unrelated to their
performance on the task (Snyder, 1980).
cates,

Some evidence indi

then, that people do try to avoid responsibility by

offering excuses.

This research is concerned, however, only

with the offering of excuses and not the acceptance of them.
The success of self-handicapping strategies as evidenced by
reductions in observer's attributions of responsibility has
not been addressed in this literature.

The process by which

attributions of responsibility are mitigated in the presence
of excuses is still unclear.
An indication of the possible types of process is given
by another philosopher.

Strawson (1974) makes a connection

between a victim's feelings of resentment at being wronged
or an observer's vicarious resentment of a wrong perpetrated
upon another, and the attributions of responsibility that we
make toward those who perpetrate those wrongs.

A person's

need to attribute responsibility to others is a function of
our moral (by which Strawson means "emotive")
the wrong.

reactions to

A victim of a crime can react in at least two

ways to the offending person.

The victim may analyze the

reasons and motives of the offender, and take account of the
mitigating circumstances,

thereby coming to

a conclusion
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about the
hand,

antecedent sources of the crime.

On the other

the victim will certainly feel some resentment that

his or her rights have been violated.

The

two modes of

reaction to a wrongful act, the rational analytic mode and
the reactive moralistic mode, may well be simultaneous reac
tions or one may occur without the other.
that

attribution of

responsibility is

Strawson states

based

largely

on

"reactive" processes that differ from scientific assessment
of the

situation.

By contrast,

acceptance

implies not a reactive process,

of an excuse

but a process

that seeks

environmental influences, alternative causes, and mitigating
circumstances.
What,

then,

makes

excuses

effective

responsibility and its counterparts?

mitigators

of

The perceived sources

of an action1s effects are divided into two broad catagories
by Heider

(1958) - personal causality (the effect is caused

by the person)

and impersonal

causality

(the

caused by something other than the person.

effect

It is in imper

sonal causality - which, disregarding difficult cases,
be called environmental influence source of excuses.

is

may

that we may find the

The levels of responsibility attribution

are said by Heider to be "successive stages in which attri
bution to the person decreases and attribution to the envi
ronment increases"

(Heider,

1958,

p.

113).

A look at the
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five levels of responsibility attribution proposed by Shaw &
Sulzer (1964)

will show that as the level

increases from association,

of attribution

through causality,

foreseeabil

ity, intentionality, and finally to justifiability, the num
ber and variability of acceptable
offered also

increases.

that could be

An ascription of responsibility

that relies on association will
excuse.

excuses

allow for little or no

If the accused was in any way associated with the

action, he or she is responsible regardless of extenuating
circumstances.

An ascription of responsibility that relies

on foreseeability allows

the accused to plead

action's consequences were not foreseeable.

that the

An ascription

of responsibility that relies on justifiability allows the
accused to cite a host of environmental influences to excuse
him or herself (Heider,

1958).

This implies that the effec

tiveness of excuses lies in their modification of the per
ceived "relative contribution of environmental factors to
the action outcome"

(Heider,

1958, p.

113).

That is, the

more environmental influence an observer perceives to oper
ate in the production of an effect, the more that environ
mental influence should "excuse" the actor from being con
sidered the

sole producer of the effect.

similar to a discounting effect (Kelley,

This
1973)

is very

in that the

presence of an environmental explanation should reduce the

Excuses and Responsibility
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credence given to the actor as the sole cause of the effect.
An empirical question that could,
asked,

at this point,

be

is "To what extent do people perceive and take into

account situational factors?"
should

incorporate

excuses.

the

value

The answer to this question
and mode

of operation

of

Experimental evidence indicates that the observers

of an actor are more likely to identify something about the
actor as the

source of the action,

while

likely to identify something about the

actors are more

situation as the

source for their action (see Jones and Nisbett,
early review and Nisbett & Ross,
one).
bett,

1980,

1971, for an

for a more recent

A study by Nisbett and Caputo (cited in Jones <& Nis
1971) is a good example of the tendency of observers

to overattribute the sources of an action to the actor.
this

study subjects were

In

asked to describe why they and

their best friends had chosen their respective majors:

When

explaining their own actions, the subjects listed about the
same number of stimulus reasons
as

person

explaining

reasons

(something

the behavior

(something about the major)
about

of their

themselves);

friends,

the

when

subjects

listed three times as many person reasons as stimulus rea
sons.
1967;
bett,

Other studies
Jones,
Caputo,

(Bierbrauer,

1973;

Rock, Shaver, Goethals,
Legant,

& Maracek,

1973;

Jones & Harris,

& Ward,
Storms,

1968;
1973)

Nis
also
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substantiate the effect.
The tendency of observers

to ignore powerful

situ

ational determinants of behavior has been called the "funda
mental attribution error" by Ross (1977) because he thinks a
disregard for situational factors is not an accurate repre
sentation of the true determinants of the actor's behavior.
He proposes that the tendency to attribute actions to per
sonal reasons is an error in judgement and not what a truly
rational man would do.

The experimental evidence,

then,

answers "Not much." to the question "To what extent do peo
ple take into account situational factors?"

and most exper

imenters propose that this disregard for situational expla
nations

is an error on the part of the observers.

The

weight of the evidence suggests that dispositional sources
are still more salient to observers
factors,

than are

while the reverse is true for actors'

situational
perceptions

of their own behavior.
Other theorists

(Hamilton,

1980;

Harvey,

1976)

state

that what Ross (1977) calls overattribution to the actor is
not an error, but is actually an alternative decision rule
that is different
behavior.

When

in process

from assigning

subjects "overattribute"

actor, Hamilton claims that,

sources of

an action to the

in many instances,

they are

actually deciding whether or not the actor "could have done

Excuses and Responsibility
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otherwise” and mainly engaged in assigning responsibility to
the actor on the basis of this rule.
In order to make this point,

Hamilton describes

models of the attribution process,

the scientific,

tive psychologist" model (based on Kelley’s
tion principle)

and

(based

& Davis'

on Jones

theory) .

legal

"intuitive

covaria

laywer"

1965 correspondent

"intui

model

inference

This distinction is not unlike the one made by

Strawson (1974)
behavior.

the

1973

two

between scientific and reactive models of

When subjects are attempting to infer the causes

of behavior,

states Hamilton, then one may speak truthfully

of a fundamental attribution error,

but when subjects are

deciding about responsibility and sanctions, the fundamental
attribution error is not applicable.
ing judgments
says Hamilton,

about responsibility,

When subjects are mak
they are

interested,

in what the rational man would do.

They are

concerned with whether the rational man could have done oth
erwise in the

situation than did the real

rational man could have done otherwise,

actor.
then

the

should be expected to have done otherwise also.
if observers are ascribing responsibility,

If the
actor

Therefore,

the tendency to

overattribute to the actor is not an error.

The rule of

"could have done otherwise" is only concerned with environ
mental

influences if they could conceivably override

the

Excuses and Responsibility
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choice of the person.

If these external causal forces are

not irresistible, if a rational man could have been expected
to ignore or overcome them,

then they are not counted as

significant influences on the action and will therefore not
be acceptable

excuses.

Mere

influence is not enough.

"scientific” analysis of an action, states Hamilton,

A

should

take into account small influences by the environment, but a
"legal" analysis need not be concerned with environmental
influence until

it is overwhelming.

The

stronger a per

ceived causal force the excuse is, the more effective mitigator of responsibiilty it should be.
ceived causal

However,

force of the excuse need not be

related to mitigation of responsibility,

the per
linearly

mitigation could

occur only at high levels of perceived causal force and low
levels of causal force
mitigation.

could be

ineffective in producing

It could be that the threshold for the percep

tion of environmental influence is lower for subjects doing
causal attribution than it is for subjects doing responsi
bility

attribution.

Conceivably

strength of the excusing

then,

circumstance

the

perceived

should affect

its

ability to mitigate responsibility attributed to the actor.
Social psychologists should,

states Hamilton,

be more

careful in assuming what it is subjects are attempting to do
when they interpret a social situation.

Often,

subjects are

Excuses and Responsibility
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lay scientists and are attempting to make veridical state
ments about the dispositions of other persons.
hand,

observers may well be

On the other

attempting to determine

the

responsibility of an actor for an effect the actor has
already produced.

When this is the case,

subjects may be

correctly interested in the valence of the
interested in environmental forces.
nal,

act and less

Certainly if the exter

environmental forces are so great that the actor was

forced to commit the act, an observer should not hold the
actor responsible.
another action,

But,

if the

actor could have chosen

and instead picked this one,

the observer

can, with some degree of confidence, hold him responsible.
It would seem, then, that the more choices an individual has
in a situation, the more responsible that individual can be
held for his action.

,

An objection to the idea of a fundamental attribution
error was made before Hamilton's
by Harvey (1976).

(1980) paper in an article

It is suprising that Hamilton does not

refer to Harvey's theoretical or experimental work, for both
writers seem to be saying much the same thing.

Simply put,

Harvey states that actors will claim little freedom in order
to avoid sanctions, while observers will attribute perceived
freedom in order to apply sanctions.

Thus,

actors will

state that they felt they had little choice in deciding to

Excuses and Responsibility
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perform

an action

(in order

to

avoid

sanctions)

while

observers will state that the actor had much freedom of
choice

(in order to apply

sanctions).

This difference in

perception of freedom will result in the same sort of dif
ference that Ross

(1977) calls an attributional error,

and

is eminently rational when viewed from this perspective.
order to

test this proposition,

Harvey,

Harris,

In

& Barnes

(1975) had actors give ”shocks" to accomplices of the exper
imenter while observers watched.

They found that observers

attributed more freedom to refuse, and more choice in com
pleting the job (shocking the accomplice) than did actors.
Harvey reasons that this difference

is the result of the

observer's desire to apply sanctions to the actors and the
actor's desire to avoid those sanctions.
is an alternative interpretation of the

Here again there
actor - observer

difference that is not based on causal analysis, but is con
cerned with the application of

sanctions.

These

results

imply that observers may be less receptive to excuses for
actions

than are actors in that observers perceive more

ability to choose on the part of the actor and less influ
ence of the environment.
The attributional behavior of subjects can be explained
in terms of the desire of observers to ascribe responsibil
ity and

apply

sanctions and the

corresponding desire

of

Excuses and Responsibility
12

actors to avoid both

responsibility and sanctions.

The

attribution of responsibility and the application of sanc
tions are, though related, two different things and they may
vary as a function of the stimulus situations that evoke
them (Fincham <& Jaspars,

1980).

Their status as alternative

explanations for a fundamental attribution error is one fac
tor among many that they share in common.
Both Hamilton (1980) and Harvey (1976) offer alterna
tive explanations of the actor observer differences that do
not imply a cognitive error on the part of the observers.
The concept of "could have done otherwise" certainly seems
similar to the concept of freedom of choice.
of perceived options is reduced,

As the number

the perceived amount of

choice should be curtailed and along with it the perceived
freedom of the actor to do as he or she chooses.
then conclude

that the

two alternative

speaking of the same concept?
two logically

Can one

explanations

are

It certainly seems so, but

related concepts may or may not be related

phenomenally to each other.

Perceived freedom,

(i.e., phe

nomenal freedom) may not be the same thing as the perception
of whether or not the actor could have done otherwise.

If

they vary independently of one another, they could respond
differentially to the perceived intent of the actor and the
perceived strength of environmental factors.

Excuses and Responsibility
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The ability to choose one
("could have done otherwise"),

action rather than another
the perceived freedom of an

individual, and the balance of power between the individual
and the environment are all

interrelated.

The balance of

power between the environment and the person is the basis
for Heider's (1958) scale of levels of responsibility attri
bution.

This balance, in turn,

should affect the amount of

perceived freedom and the perceived ability to choose one
action instead of another.

Perceived freedom and perceived

ability to choose the action,

should,

in turn,

salience and mitigating power of an excuse.
tal evidence (Harvey,

1976; Harvey,

affect the

The experimen

Harris & Barnes,

1975)

indicates that this effect is attenuated by the desire of
observers to apply sanctions, but if, as philosophers imply,
excuses do have some effect,

this effect should be mediated

through the strength of the environmental force exerted on
the actor.

Thus, it appears that the strength oft the envi

ronmental force is a major consideration in the effective
ness of an excuse.
A look at Austin's (1961) examples of excuses will show
another characteristic

of excuses that might

ability to mitigate responsibility.

The two

affect their
excuses men

tioned above were "My arm was bumped" and "I'm so clumsy".
One difference between these two excuses is that one has an

Excuses and Responsibility
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external, environmental source, and the other has an inter
nal,

dispositional source.

that excuses which

It seems reasonable to suppose

are more

externally based

will have

greater effect in changing the balance of personal
nal)
finds

and impersonal

(external)

causality.

An excuse that

its source in an internal disposition

stupidity,

emotional weakness,

etc.)

may

(inter

(clumsiness,

be harder

for

observers to identify as an impersonal cause for an action
than an excuse that calls on external sources (coercion by
another person, being pushed, etc.).
gray areas:

There are,

of course,

alcohol abuse or drug abuse, provocation

hit me first),

etc.

(He

It is possible that the usefulness of

an excuse will depend partially on whether the excuse origi
nates from an internal or an external source.
This paper has concentrated so far on attributes of the
environment that might affect perceptions of responsibility.
And rightly so, for the basis of an excuse is in the envi
ronmental force that it could exert on the actor.
however,
Jaspars

another variable that
(1980)

that

may

strength of the excuse.

affect

decrease.

of effect

of

is mentioned by Fincham &
the

perceptions

of

the

They state that as the perceived

intention of an actor increases,
strength

There is,

any

the perceived influence or

environmental

factors

should

They have gleaned this prediction from the legal
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understanding of the condition of mens rea, or guilty mind.
A person with a guilty mind is one who has "purposely, know
ingly, recklessly, or negligently"
committed an act.

(Fincham & Jaspars,

1980)

This is established, according to Fincham

<Sc Jaspers, using a discounting procedure.

In other words,

the perceived intentionality of an action is the inverse of
the perceived environmental influence.

It is not certain,

and Fincham & Jaspers give no hints about,

whether it is

intentionality that is discounted because of environmental
influence,

or if rather,

environmental

counted because of perceived intention.
it would pay to

influence is dis
In this case, then,

manipulate both perceived environmental

influence and perceived intention and observe their effects
on attributions of freedom, ability to choose, and responsi
bility.
This experiment was concerned with manipulating both
perceived intention of the actor and the perceived strength
of the excuse

(the proposed environmental

influence).

As

mentioned above, the type of excuse used for an action may
well alter the effectiveness of that excuse.
son,

For this rea

three types of excuses were used - an excuse with a

presumably external locus of causality (coercion),

an excuse

with a questionable

and an

locus of causality

(drugs),

excuse with a presumably internal locus of causality (insan-

Excuses and Responsibility
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ity) .

There was also

environmental influence

a manipulation of strength of the
(strength of the excuse)

in which

the excuse was presented as either overwhemingly strong or
as weak.

In order to control for the intent of the actor

(Fincham & Jaspers,
also manipulated,

1980), perceived intent of the actor was

so that the actor appeared to have either

intended the action or to have not intended it.
It was hypothesized that the pattern of responses to
questions about responsibility would differ from the pattern
of responses to questions concerning dispositional attribu
tions (in this case measured by predicted future actions of
the actor).

This would indicate that attributing responsi

bility and attributing dispositions invlove different pro
cesses.

Further,

those subjects

in the high strength of

excuse condition should attribute less responsibility,
probability of conviction,

and recommend less

less

severe sen

tencing than those in the low strength condition.

Those

subjects in the high intent condition should attribute more
responsibility, more probability of conviction,
mend more
condition.

severe sentencing then those in the
It was

and recom
low intent

also hypothesized that the externally

located excuse would produce more mitigation of responsibil
ity, conviction,

and sentencing than the internally located

excuse, while also producing less perceived probability that

Excuses and Responsibility
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the actor would commit a similar act in the future.
Most of the other predictions that can be found in the
literature can

be phrased

as correlational

predictions.

Perceived strength of the excuse and perceived intent of the
actor should be negatively correlated (Fincham <Sc Jaspars,
1980).

Perceived freedom of the actor to choose and per

ceived amount that the

actor "could have done

otherwise"

should both correlate positively with responsibility,
viction,

con

and severity of sentencing.
Method

Subj ects
Subjects were 68 males and 76 females enrolled in an
Introductory Psychology class at the College of William &
Mary.

They received class credit for their participation.

Subjects were run in groups according to which cell of the
experiment they had been assigned.

Each cell was run only

once, and the size of each cell ranged from 8 to 14.
Independent Variables
As mentioned above, three types of excuses were used an excuse with an assumed external locus of causality (coer
cion), an excuse with an assumed questionable locus of cau
sality (drugs), and an excuse with an assumed internal locus
of causality

(insanity).

Insanity was chosen as the inter-
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nal locus excuse because, though it is presumably inflicted
on an unwilling person,

it may prove difficult for subjects

to separate the insanity from the insane person.

Coercion

by another person was chosen as the external locus excuse
because,

though it is separate from the actor, it requires

some overt action on the part of the actor.

Drugs were cho

sen as the questionable locus excuse because,
pretest,

that excuse was believed more

excuse of alcohol.
was

in an informal

readily than the

Crossed with this type of excuse factor

a manipulation of the strength of the excuse.

strength factor had two

levels,

each cell of these conditions,
that the

strong and weak.

This
Within

half of the subjects learned

actor had contemplated the

action before

(high

intention) while half of the subjects heard the actor deny
any premeditation of the act

(low intention).

Finally,

a

control group was also included that received none of these
manipulations in order to determine if there were any miti
gating effects

for just the presence of an excuse.

resulted in a 3 x 2 x 2 factorial design with

This

a control

group.
Stimulus Materials
Stimulus materials were videotapes of an interview,
ostensibly between

a laywer and his client.

The viewer

looked over the lawyer's shoulder and at the accused.

There
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was

only one

accused,

light on the

set,

and that was behind the

creating a silhouette so that the actor’s facial

features could not be easily discerned.

The videotapes were

in color, and were from four to five minutes in length.

The

first section of the film contained a news announcement by a
commentator.

The commentator informed the viewers that the

accused was a computer programmer for Central State Univer
sity, and had been fired from his job about two weeks before
the interview occured.

He also explained that the accused

had, two days before the present interview, climbed atop one
of the campus buildings of Central

State University

and

begun firing into the students changing classes.
The commentator then stated that the forthcoming inter
view was between the accused Mike Johnson and his lawyer.
The interview began with a monologue by Mike Johnson that
contained the manipulation of the type of excuse
strength.

During this monologue,

and its

Mike mentioned his wife

and also indicated that he thought that he should not have
been fired from his job.

In the coerced condition,

Mike

stated that he was forced to shoot the people by the "Peo
ple' s Liberation Front" who had either threatened to bomb
his

house

strength).

(low
In

strength)
the

drugs

or

kidnapped

condition,

his

Mike

wife
pleaded

(high
that

because of his depression he had taken a few drugs,

but
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still remembered his actions

(low strength) or that he had

taken 111 don’t know how many or what kind" of drugs and
could remember very little of the incident

(high strength).

In the insane condition, Mike stated that he had suffered a
"mental break" but was "perfectly fine now"

(low strength)

or that his mental break was so severe as to
present functioning
logue,

In the

ensuing dia

the manipulation of intent took place.

In the high

intention

(high strength).

impede his

condition,

Mike

showed

little

regret

for

his

action and stated that "the bastards in the administration
need something to shake them up".

In the low intent condi

tion, Mike was obviously contrite

and said that he would

"never think of doing something like that just to get back
at the administration".
across the conditions,
in Appendix A.
manipulation,

Other

responses

of Mike varied

and the complete scripts can be found

The dialogue was,

except

for the

intent

substantially the same for each cell of the

design.
Dependent Measures
The dependent measures consisted of eleven questions
about the following perceptions or judgments:
strength of the excuse,

perceived

perceived

intention of the actor,

possibility that the actor "could have done otherwise", per
ceived freedom of the

actor

to decide,

moral

and

legal
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responsibility of the

actor,

probability that the

actor

would "do the same sort of thing again”, likelihood that the
subject would convict that actor of the crime,

recommended

severity of the sentence, amount of responsibility that the
actor felt for the action, and the likelihood that the actor
would have done the action if the excuse not had any effect.
The subjects provided their responses

to the questions on

nine point scales with higher scores in each case indicating
more of the variable measured.

The actual measures used can

be found in Appendix B.
Procedure
When all the subjects had arrived for a session, Exper
imenter 1 told them that the purpose of the study was to
investigate perceptions of televised courtroom situations,
and the subjects were asked to sign forms indicating their
voluntary consent to participate.
forms were collected,

After

all the consent

the tape was presented.

Again,

the

tape consisted of a short introductory news comment and then
the interview.

Subjects in the control condition received

only the news comment and therefore did not receive any of
the manipulations of type of excuse,
intent.

strength of excuse, or

The order of presentation of the tapes was randomly

determined.

When the tape was over, Experimenter 2 (who was

blind to the hypotheses of the study) turned the tape off,
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explained the dependent measures,
begin filling them out.
responses,

and told the subjects to

When the subjects had given their

the questionnaires were collected,

and the sub

jects were thoroughly debriefed by Experimenter 1.
Results

Data were analyzed with a 3 (excuse) x 2 (intent) x 2
(strength) analysis of variance with a control group.

Fur

ther analysis was done within each excuse as a 2 (intent) x
2 (strength)

analysis of variance.

This method of analysis

will slightly inflate the error rate in each 2 x 2
(Kirk,
formed.

1968)

analysis

as a function of the number of F tests per

There are several ways to correct for this increase

of Type I error, but none that is universally accepted.
method involves lowering alpha from

One

.05 to a smaller value,

but this method is indiscriminate in selection of those dif
ferences considered significant.

For this reason,

level of significance will be used,

the

.05

but exact probability

levels will be reported with the F values so that the reader
may judge the reliability of the reported F value.
correlations (Guilford & Fruchter,

Average

1973) were also computed

between each pair of the eleven dependent measures.

Fish

er's r to z' transformation was used to test for selected

Excuses and Responsibility

23

differences between these correlations (see Kirk, 1978).
Control Group
All the dependent measures reported here are on a scale
of 1 to 9.

Given this as the largest possible range,

it is

interesting that many of the ranges of the measures were
high (5 to 9).

Table 1 shows the frequency distributions of

the nine dependent measures given to the control group.

Insert Table 1 about here

Two of the original eleven measures (strength of excuse and
excuse effect) were ommited because the stimuli shown to the
control group contained no information about

any possible

excuses available to the actor.
The standard deviations(of the measures in the control
condition were:

perceived intent of the actor (SD = 2.33),

amount of choice (SD = 1.84), perceived freedom (SD = 2.31),
moral responsibility

(SD = 2.12),

prediction

of a future

similar action (SD = 1.86), conviction (SD = 1.07), sanction
(SD = 1.27),

personal sense of resonsibility (SD = 1.65),

legal responsibility (SD = 0.75).
The control condition was tested against the combined
means of all the experimental groups and no significant dif-

Excuses and Responsibility

24

ferences were

found on the nine dependent variables

that

could be tested.
Manipulation Checks
Intent.
actor,

In order to check for perceived intent of the

the subjects were asked "How likely is it that Mike

intended to do what he did?"

The main effect for the intent

condition was significant, F (1, 121) = 5.90, p = .017.

The

high intent subjects perceived the stimulus person as having
intended the action more (M = 4 . 8 6 ) than the low intent sub
jects (M = 3.89).

The interaction between excuse and intent

was not significant,

F (1,38) = 1.45, p = .239.

The means

for the manipulation checks can be found in Table 2.

Insert Table 2 about here

Strength.

Subjects

were

also

asked

to

rate

the

strength of the excuse by answering the question "How much
influence did the drugs
rists)

have

(insanity,

over Mike’s actions?"

these means was not significant,
.156.

or fear of the terro
The difference

F (1,

among

121) = 2.04,

p =

Normally, when there is no main effect, it is consid

ered improper to test for simple effects (Kirk,

1968).

But

since the strength manipulation was central to this study,
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and also since the strength manipulations for each excuse
were different, the 2 x 2

analyses within excuses were still

performed.

remembered that any significant

It should be

differences in these post hoc tests may be due to random
variation.

In the subsequent analyses,

the difference for

strength was significant in the coerced condition, F (1, 38)
= 5.75, p = .022, with the subjects in the strong excuse
condition rating the influence of the excuse as higher

(M =

7.75), than did those subjects in the low strength condition
(M = 6.63).
This same difference held for the drugs condition (high
strength:

M = 5.60, low strength:

M = 5.13). The differ

ence in the insane conditions was not in the same direction,
but was negligible:
M = 7.20).

(high strength:

M = 7.10;

low strength:

The excuse x strength interaction was not sig

nificant, F (2, 121) = 1.19, p = .306.
Strength Index.

A strength index was computed by subtract

ing the excuse effect from the perceived strength of the
excuse.

The excuse effect is the perceived likelihood that

the actor would have performed the action if the excuse not
had any effect.

The excuse effect was obtained by having

the subjects respond to the question "Assuming that Mike had
not been at all afraid of the terrorists (emotionally unsta-
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ble,

or

had not

taken any drugs

at

all)

what

likelihood that Mike would have shot the people

is the
anyway?"

There were no significant effects on the strength index in
the overall analysis.

Again, because of the importance of

the strength manipulation in this study,
was done within each excuse.

a 2 x 2 analysis

There were significant differ

ences in the strength index in subsequent analyses in the
drugs

condition,

F(l,

insanity condition,
coerced condition,

45)

F(l,

= 4.21,
38)

p =

= 6.59,

.046,

and in the

p = .014.

In the

the mean for the high strength group was

-1.53, while that of the low strength group was -1.93.
same direction held for the insanity condition,

The

with the

mean for the high condition being -.62 and that of the low
condition being -2.05.
the

same

direction

strength:

The drugs condition did not evidence

( high

M = -3.56).

strength:

M

=

-2.40;

low

The strength x excuse interaction,

however, was not significant, F (2, 121) = 1.04, p = .308.
Responsibility Measures
Moral and Legal Responsibility.

In light of the dif

ferences to be reported for conviction,
tion,

severity of sanc

and prediction of the actor's future behavior,

interesting

that there

were no

significant effects

it is
for

either moral or legal responsibility in either the overall
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analysis or the subsequent 2 x 2 analyses.
The overall means for each of these measures were above
the midpoint of the possible range with the mean for moral
responsibility = 6.64, and the mean for legal responsibility
= 7.35.
ures

The overall standard deviations for the two meas

were:

moral

responsibility

responsibility (SD = 2.06).

(SD

=

2.22)

and

legal

There was a dramatic difference

between the two variables in the shape of the distribution,
with the kurtosis for legal

responsibility being 2.07 and

the kurtosis for moral responsibility being only .33 (the
higher the kurtosis value, the more sharply peaked the dis
tribution of scores).

This suggests that moral responsibil

ity varied more widely among the conditions than did legal
responsibility.
Personal sense of responsibilty.

When subjects we re

asked "How responsible do you think Mike feels for shooting
the people?"

there were

several significant differences.

This appeared as a significant main effect in the intention
factor, F (1, 121) = 22.09,

p = .000, with subjects in the

high intent condition perceiving that the
felt less

responsible than did those subjects in the low

intent condition.
(higher

stimulus person

numbers

responsibility)

These means were
mean

more

perceived

4.71

for

sense

and 2.97 for high intent.

of

low intent
personal

This dependent
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variable was also involved in an excuse x strength interac
tion,
that

F (2, 121) = 3.30, p = .040.
the accused

felt

less

The subjects perceived

responsible

under the

high

strength condition than under the low strength condition,
but only for the person who pleaded insanity.

This interac

tion is pictured in Figure 1.

Insert Figure 1 about here

This difference did not show up in any of the other excuses.
There was also a significant excuse x strength x intention
interaction in this variable, F (2, 121) = 4.53, p = .013.
Most of this

interaction can be seen to occur within low

intent and across the three excuse conditions.

This three

way interaction is pictured in Figure 2.

Insert Figure 2 about here

For the

low intent,

steady decrease
coercion

to

strength condition,

there was a

in perceived sense of responsibility from

drugs

strength means,

high

to

insanity.

The

low

intent,

across the excuse conditions were:

high
coercion

Excuses and Responsibility

29

(5.55), drugs (4.09),

and insanity (2.75).

reversed in the low intention,
only for insanity.

This trend was

low strength condition - but

These means were: coercion (4.72). drugs

(4.23), and insanity (6.70).

Only in the condition in which

the accused pleaded insanity, the low strength of excuse and
low intention conditions led to more perceived consciousness
of personal responsibility than did high strength of excuse
and low intention.

The means for perceived personal sense

of responsibility,

legal

and moral

responsibility can be

found in Table 3.

Insert Table 3 about here

Sanctions
Conviction.
jury member,

how

Subjects were also asked

"If you were a

likely would you be to convict Mike?"

There was a main effect for excuse on probability of convic
tion,

F (2,

121) = 3.60, p = .030.

Coercion was perceived

as the best excuse (M = 6.63), while drugs and insanity were
undifferentiated:

M =

7.62

and

M

= 7.20

respectively

(higher numbers mean higher probability of conviction).

A

test between means collapsed across the other 2 conditions
substantiates

this,

yielding

a

significant

difference

between coercion and the combined effect of drugs and insan-
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ity, F (1,120) = 17.00, p =

.000 (see Winer, 1962, p. 209),

while the test between drugs and insanity was not signifi
cant,

F

(1,120) = 1.24,

p =

orthogonal to each other.

.268.

These two tests were

Interestingly,

difference between the low intent, high
and the low intent,

low strength,

there was not a
strength,

insane,

the large difference mentioned above

insane,

to correspond to

in sense of personal

responsibility.
Sentencing.

Subjects were

sentence would you recommend
sentence applied, there was,

also

asked

for Mike?"

"How severe

a

For severity of

again, a main effect for type

of excuse, F (2, 121) = 3.98, p = .021.

In parallel with

the results on probablility of conviction, the excuse pro
ducing the least
5.27,

while drugs

effective,

severity of sentence was coercion,
and insanity

were not

M =

differentially

with means of 6.33 and 5.95 respectively.

This

claim is substantiated by the nonsignificance of the test
for a difference between the drugs and insanity condition, F
(1,120) = -97, p = .327, and the significance of the test of
the combined means for drugs and insanity against the mean
of the coerced condition,

F

(1,120)

= 15.82, p =

These tests were orthogonal to each other.
conviction,
choice,

severity

of

sentence,

amount

.000.

The means for
of

perceived

and prediction of future behavior may be

seen in
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Table 4.

Insert Table 4 about here

Predictability Measures
Could have done otherwise.

There were also some sig

nificant differences in response to the question "How possi
ble is it that Mike could have done
shoot the people?".

something other than

For this dependent measure,

there was

an interaction, F (2, 121) = 3.32, p = .039, between type of
excuse and amount of intention.

For both insanity and coer

cion, the subjects perceived more availability of choice in
the

low intention

condition condition than in

intention condition.
different.
reversed,

In

the

The pattern for drugs,
drugs

condition,

the

the high

however,

pattern

was

was

so that subjects in the low intention condition

perceived more availability of choice
high intention condition perceived

and subjects in the

less.

group were 7.87 and 6.66 respectively.

Means for this

This interaction is

pictured in Figure 3.

Insert Figure 3 about here
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Prediction

measure.

There

were

relatively

strong

effects across type of excuse and intent when subjects were
asked "'How probable is it that Mike would do the same sort
of thing again?"

The effect in the excuse condition,

121) = 5.90, p =.0 0 4 ,

F (2,

was mainly due to a large increase in

prediction for the insane condition (M = 6.20) in contrast
to the

small difference between coercion and drugs:

4.51 and 4.81 respectively.

This

M =

is substantiated by the

nonsignificance of the test between the means of coercion
and drugs, F (1, 120) = .416, p = .520, and the significance
of the test of the combined means of coercion and drugs
against that of insanity, F (1,120) = 7.58, p = .007.
tests were

orthogonal

to each other.

Thus,

These

the person

pleading insanity was perceived as more likely to commit a
similar crime than those pleading either coercion or intoxi
cation.

The effect for intention,

F (1, 121) = 10.30, p =

.002, was such that subjects in the low intention group per
ceived the person to be less
crime again (M = 4.45)

likely to commit a similar

than did those subjects in the high

intention condition (M = 5.79).

It is interesting in light

of the strong effects for prediction, conviction,
tion,

and sanc

that there were no significant differences in either

moral or legal responsibility.
Excuse effect.

This was a measure of the likelihood
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that the accused would have committed the act without the
effect of the excuse.

In order to assess

this,

subjects

were asked ’’Assuming that Mike had not been at all afraid of
the terrorists

(emotionaly unstable,

or had not taken any

drugs at all) what is the likelihood that Mike would have
shot the people anyway?”

There were main effects on this

measure for both type of excuse and intent.
for excuse, F (2, 121) = 10.70, p =

The main effect

.000, was concentrated

in the difference between the drugs condition and the other
two

levels.

The mean value

for drugs was

coerced was 3.21 and insane was 2.80.

4.49,

while

That the difference

was mainly because of the drugs condition is substantiated
by the significance of the test between the combined means
of coercion and insanity against the mean of the drugs con
dition,
test,

F (1,120) = 38.78, p =
its

orthogonal

pair,

the

.000.

In addition to this

difference

coerced and the insane condition,

between

the

was not significant,

F

(1,120) = .32, p = .523.
There was also a main effect for intent, F (1, 121) =
25.5, p = .000.

Those subjects in the high intent condition

perceived the accused as more likely to have commited the
act (M = 4.30) than did those in the low intent condition (M
= 2.73).
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Relationships among measures
Because most of the hypotheses forwarded by theorists
in this area are correlational in nature,

it was of interest

to inspect correlations among the dependent measures.

All

of the correlations reported in this section were computed
on the entire sample (N = 144).
case

were

those

correlations

strength of the excuse

The only exceptions to this
involving

(N = 133),

perceived

because this question

could not be asked of the control group.
tions are reported (Guilford & Fructer,
more correctly

the

Average correla
1973) because they

represent the overall correlations without

regard to experimental effects.

These average correlations

retained the same pattern evidenced by the unmodified over
all correlations,
Probabilities

but most of the correlations

associated

with

these

improved.

correlations

are

reported conventionally, because most of them were below the
.01 level of significance, and would be unaffected by a low
ering of the alpha to .03.

Perceived strength of excuse and

perceived intent were negatively correlated, r = -.43, p <
.001,

as Fincham and Jaspars

(1976) predicts,

(1980)

predict.

As Harvey

perceived freedom to choose was positively

correlated with moral and legal responsibility,
.001 and r = .49, p < .001 respectively.

r = .44, p <

Freedom to choose

the action was also positively correlated with probability
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of conviction and severity of sentencing,
and r = .50, p
accused

< .001 respectively.

"could have done otherwise"

r = .52, p < .001

Whether or not the
(Hamilton,

1980)

was

also correlated with probability of conviction, r = .64, p <
.001,

and with severity of sentencing,

r = .43, p < .001,

but was less strongly related to moral and legal responsi
bility,

r = .26, p < .01 and r = .23, p < .01.

These two

dependent measures of freedom to choose and "could have done
otherwise" could be considered as the same concept (though
their correlation was low:
helpful, then,

r = .38 p < .01).

It would be

to determine whether they correlated-differ

ently with moral and legal responsibilty.

The correlation

of perceived freedom with legal responsibility was signifi
cantly greater than that of "could have done otherwise" with
legal responsibility, z = -1.84, p < .05.

The correlation

of perceived freedom with moral responsibility was greater
than that of "could have done otherwise" with moral respon
sibility, but the difference was not significant, z = -1.30,
p = .095.
The most startling result was the complete lack of cor
relation between either of the responsibility measures and
the prediction measure.

Moral responsibility failed to cor

relate with prediction that the accused would do
acts in the future, r = -.06, p > .15.

similar

Legal responsibility
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also had no correlation with predictions that the accused
would commit similar acts in the future, r = .09, p > .15.
Discussion
It is evident from these results that different excuses
are differentially effective in mitigating probability of
conviction and severity of punishment.
measures,

coercion was perceived as the excuse offering the

largest amount of mitigation.
dictions

For both of these

This is in line with the pre

stated earlier that excuses

located are the best mitigators.

that are externally

Given the lack of signifi

cant difference between the control condition and the exper
imental group, it cannot be said that giving any excuse will
reduce probability of conviction or reduce severity of pun
ishment.

The

frequency distributions of the variables in

the control condition (see Table 1) evidenced wide variation
of response for each measure.
sible to

identify people

It might, therefore,

(depending upon

be pos

attitudinal fac

tors) that are more willing to accept excuses than others.
The central question of this study may be phrased "To
what extent do observers take into account situational fac
tors in the form of excuses,

and what is it about excuses

that mediates this effect?"

Given the significant differ

ences in conviction,

sentencing,

and prediction of future
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behavior,

it is obvious that there were different effects of

the excuse depending upon which excuse was invoked.
mediating

factor may well be what Heider

(1958, p.

The
113)

calls the "relative contribution of environmental factors to
the action outcome".
supposedly

less

Less

sanction,

responsibility,
is attributed

and therefore

as the

balance

between personal and environmental force tips in the favor
of the environment.
excuses

in this

while another

It should be remembered that one of the

study

(coercion)

(insanity) was

was externally

internally located.

located,
Excuses

that find their source in the external environment should
"distance" the action and its effects from the actor better
than those excuses whose source is internal to the actor.
This study provides experimental evidence to that effect.
Probability of

conviction,

predictions

that the

accused

would do a similar action again and severity of sentencing
responded in accordance with the predictions made concerning
the effectiveness of externally located excuses as opposed
to

internally

"inseparable"

located
from

the

excuses.
actor

Those
should

excuses

provide

that
the

are

least

excuse, increase predictions that the actor would commit the
action again,

and do the least to mitigate probability of

conviction and severity of sanction.
The large difference in predictions of future similar
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actions for actors pleading insanity when compared to either
drugs or coercion certainly suggests subjects had difficulty
separating the insanity from the insane person.

This dif

ference indicates that there may be some truth in the notion
that there

are differential effects for different excuses

dependent upon the degree of separation of the excuse from
the actor.
insanity

It certainly seems that the subjects considered

(strong or weak)

to be a stable disposition that

would lead the accused to commit the crime again,
chance.

given the

Predictions that an actor will commit a similar act

again in the future are indications that a disposition to
commit similar acts has been inferred (Jones & Davis, 1968).
It appears
internal,

that the subjects perceived insanity to be an
stable disposition that will be effective in the

determination of future actions.
In fact,

lay opinion of insanity may well be the para

digmatic case of a lasting,

stable,

internal disposition.

If this is so, it points up a difficulty with the conception
of what a disposition actually is and how it is effective in
producing behavior.
behavior,
rable,

one

Is it the insanity that produces the

or is it the insane person?
could hold

the insanity

behavior and excuse the person.

If the two are sepa

"responsible"

for the

This would hold true if a

disposition is a cause of behavior, but would not be true if
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a disposition were considered to only "predispose" the per
son to the action.
sitions

If this latter interpretation of dispo

is correct,

behavior,

it is the person that performs

and therefore the person who

the

is held responsible

for the action.
Excuses exert their effect by providing another causal
explanation for the outcome of the action.
insanity causes behavior,
if, however,

behavior

the person to do

then insanity is not a direct

and therefore

if

it is an excuse for that behavior;

insanity only "predisposes"

the behavior,

Therefore,

a poor

excuse

cause of the

- if any at all.

Finally, one may speculate from the results that if insanity
is a disposition (which the large differences in prediction
indicate)
difference
cate),

and insanity is not an excuse (which the lack of
in the

responsibility measures

seems to indi

then dispositions do not cause behavior in at least

the strict sense of the term "cause" required for something
to be an excuse.
Both probability of conviction and severity of sanction
respond to the difference in excuses dependent upon the
source (internal, external) of the excuse.
tion and sanction,

For both convic

the drugs condition was slightly higher

than the insane condition and much higher than the coerced
condition.

This increase for conviction and sanction in the
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drugs condition may be a function of a confound of valence
of the invoked excuse.

Drug abuse is a negatively valenced

action and its valence may well extend to the person abusing
the drug.

And, as Heider (1958) notes, a person who is neg

atively valenced will receive higher levels of punishment
than one who is neutral with respect to valence.
valence effect could be partialled out,

If this

it would be inter

esting to see whether or not a steady increase in both prob
ability of conviction and severity of

sanction would be

established.
In the introduction to this study two different expla
nations

of the

mediating factor

in responsibility

were

reported - Harvey’s (1976) perceived freedom principle and
Hamilton’s

(1980)

"could have done

otherwise"

principle.

Are these two different views of the same process., competing
explanations,

or different explanations for different pro

cesses?
The

failure of the

strength manipulation,

which was

specifically designed to test for these two principles, will
make a concrete conclusion difficult to obtain, but there is
something to be gained from correlational results.

The cor

relations of perceived freedom with moral and legal respon
sibility,
tencing

probability of conviction,
were

all

significant

at

and severity of sen
.001,

with

legal
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responsibility having

a significantly

higher

correlation

with perceived freedom than with "could have done otherwise"
and the difference between the correlations of moral respon
sibility with the two measures being marginally significant.
In addition to this,

the intercorrelation between perceived

freedom and "could have done otherwise" was not as high as
expected,

being only

.38.

This would lead one to suspect

that if "could have done otherwise" responds to anything in
the stimulus situation,

it does so with a fair amount of

independence from the fluctuation of perceived freedom.

So,

if indeed "could have done otherwise" is a factor in attrib
uting responsibility etc., its effects may well differ from
those of perceived freedom.

Again,

these

conclusions are

tentative at best, and a clear manipulation of the strength
of an excuse will be needed to establish some connection.
It is interesting in the light of the big differences
found for recommended sentencing,
and probability of conviction,

predicted future action,

that there were no differ

ences in amount of legal or moral responsibility ascribed to
the accused.

The reason behind this may also explain the

failure of the strength manipulation.
the severity of the crime
in our society)

It is possible that

(mass murder is deplored by most

tended to wash out any effects that would

have otherwise been found.

This particular type of crime
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was chosen in the first place because it seemed the only
type of crime for which an excuse as desperate as insanity
would be used.

Because of the nature of the crime, subjects

may well have been insensitive to a situation that would
mitigate responsibility - but could have been receptive to
mitigating probability of conviction or severity of punish
ment.

These latter two measures may be more "flexible" to

mitigating circumstances than is responsibility.

The reac

tion to a crime of such gravity is such that very little can
overcome the indignation of the observer and excuse the per
son.

In alleviating one problem,

another.

we may well have caused

An approach that would eliminate this difficulty -

and possibly take advantage of it at the same time - would
be to manipulate the severity of the offense.

A difference

that is evident at a lower severity of offense may dissappear when

a more severe

crime is perpetrated.

An excuse

that will work when I have spilled coffee on your couch will
not have the same effect if I have wrecked your car.
Another difficulty that was noted during the debriefing
of the

subjects was

accused's testimony.

their disbelief

in the truth of the

This was reflected in the odd pattern

of responses to the question "How resonsible do you think
Mike

feels for shooting the people?"

function of the medium used.

This was mostly a

When the subjects

reported
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those cues to which they responded most,

tonal,

postural,

and gestural cues were invariably reported as more important
than verbal ones.

These cues, when added to the subject's

tendency to be skeptical in the first place,

merely created

error variance that had nothing to do with the theoretical
variables being investigated.

This particular study is an

example of the attempt at ecological validity producing dif
ficulty with the instantiation of the theoretical variable.
A better instantiation

(which could even save ecological

validity) would be the use of newspaper articles to present
the information about the actor.
Another question that needs answering is one raised by
Hamilton

(1980),

"Are

there

two

different

processes

-

assigning responsibility and assigning causal status - or is
one derived from the other?"

It seems that the answer from

this study would be yes; there are two processes and they
are at least not identical.

The complete lack of any corre

lation between the prediction variable and the two responsi
bility measures lends credence to this assertion.
outcomes -

assigned responsibility and prediction of future

action - do not at all covary,
ferent

factors

experimental

The two

affect the

evidence

and this suggests that dif

different outcomes.

lends

credence

to this

Also

the

suggestion.

There were large differences in the subject's predictions of
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future similar action by the actor, but no significant dif
ferences

in

either perceived

responsibility.

moral

or

perceived

legal

Those factors that affected predictions by

the subjects had no affect on the subject's ascription of
responsibility to the actor.

And if we assume that pre

diction is a type of causal attribution, these two processes
are at least differentially affected by certain types of
evidence.
Finally, we should gain some perspective on the "funda
mental attribution error" from the results of this experi
ment.

The lack of significant difference between the con

trol group and the experimental group was in line with the
predictions of Nisbett <5c Ross

(1980) that subjects will pay

more attention to the action of the actor and less attention
to the situational
were, however,

factors

(whence come excuses).

There

differences in the relative effectiveness of

the different excuses,

so it cannot be said that the sub

jects entirely ignored the

situational

excusing factors.

For a crime of this magnitude, they may well have considered
the excusing situational factors less relevant, but one can
not doubt that they were attended to.

We may safely con

clude that situational factors may be important,
importance
excuses,

hinges

on

their

salience,

their effectiveness depends

and,

but their

if they

are

on their ability to
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"distance" the actor from the action.
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Figure 1
Excuse x intent interaction
for Perceived Choice
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Figure 2
Excuse x strength x intent interaction
for perceived personal sense of responsibility
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Figure 3
Excuse x Intention interaction for
perceived personal sense of responsibility
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APPENDIX A

Coercion, Low Strength, Low intention
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen
tral State University.
days later,

Mike was fired from his job, and two

in what some have described as "an attempt to

retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into
the crowds

of

students changing classes.

He kept up a

steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa
tion.

At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with

the SWAT team.

Twenty tense minutes passed while the police

cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic
tims.

Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears.

toll was taken of the damage,
fatally injured,

When a

it was found that 3 had been

another 5 were in serious condition at a

local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur
der and manslaughter.

He was detained by the police and is
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now under security at the state prison.

The filmclip that

you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between
Mike and his lawyer,
Mike's

John Gordon.

They are preparing for

first court appearance by reviewing the kinds

of

questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what
happened and also review some of the questions
asked.

you'll be

One of. the first things I'll ask you is to give a

description about what happened.

Tell me again what you'll

say, as if you are talking to the judge.'
Johnson:
As I am sure you all know,
occured,

on the day that the shootings

I was contacted by the 'People's Liberation Front'

and told that if I did not conform exactly to their specifi
cations they would have one of their members bomb my house.
The man on the phone said that this action was forced upon
them by the backward policies of the university.

The school

had cut off funding to the group and removed their status as
a campus organization.

They told me that I should climb

onto the roof of classroom building (A) at twelve noon and
shoot at the passing crowds.

I thought it was a joke, until
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someone showed up at the house about 11 AM. When I opened
the door, he forced his way into the house and told me that
he had come to escort me to classroom building (A).

He then

pulled a pistol on me and forced me to get into his car.
drove me to the building,

He

got a suitcase out of the trunk,

and led me up to the roof.

After giving me the suitcase, he

told me that it contained a high power gun.
locking the door to the roof behind him.

He then left,

It was obvious to

me that I had no choice left but to do as he said.
Gordon:
Okay,

that's good.

Now for some of the questions that the

prosecution is bound to ask.
Have you had any connection with the People's Liberation
Front before?
Johnson:
NO!,

of course not.

I didn't even know that they were in

existence until they started calling me.
Gordon:
Wait a minute,wait a minute. You are implying that they have
called you several times.

Do you want to make that public

knowledge?
Johnson:
Well -- no, but they had called me several times before.
G:
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Well then,

if you don't want them to know,

you shouldn't

give any hint that you've been contacted before.

I think

that you should place stress on the fact that the front's
choice of you was arbitrary.
spokesman from the People's

Be sure you tell them that.
Liberation Front has

A

already

relased a press statement to that effect and you should be
sure to not contradict it.
J:
Do you think I want to?
arbitrary.

I know that their choice of me was

I didn't know they existed and don't know much

more now - don't want to know anymore.
G:
A l igh t, what about the statements that you were 'retaliat
ing at the university'? Are those true?
J:
Oh come on! Of course not.
those people
anything,

I wouldn't think of shooting all

just to get back at the

administration.

If

I'd shoot an administrator.

G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah,

right.

like that.
G:

But everybody knows I wouldn't do

something
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Nope. Everyone doesn’t know.

Besides, the prosecution isn't

looking to portray you as a nice guy,

they want a convic

tion .
J:
so I've never thought of shooting people
for any reason and I can’t make jokes in court.
G:
That's right.
timony.

What

It won't seem like a joke when it becomes tes
about the possibility that you could have

called the police to get you out of the situation.
J:
Well I sure couldn't call the cops when the man had a pistol
to by back!

Besides,

I thought

it was

a joke until he

showed u p .
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have
avoided that.
J:
How? And have my house blown to bits? These guys were seri
ous !
G:
Surely you value other people's lives more than you do your
house?
J:
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Yeah,

sure I do, but I was under pressure then.

spent fourty

I had just

five minutes with a gun pointed at me.

I

didn't have time to think.
G:
Okay,

just make sure the court realizes the extent of the

pressure that you were under.

(looks at watch)

Its time.

All you need to do is to be calm and answer the questions as
honestly as possible.

If someone asks a dangerous question,

I'll catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Coercion, Low Strength, High Intention
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen
tral State University.
days later,

Mike was fired from his job, and two

in what some have described as "an attempt to

retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into
the

crowds of

students

changing classes.

He kept up a

steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa
tion.

At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with

the SWAT team.

Twenty tense minutes passed while the police

cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic
tims.

Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears.

toll was taken of the damage,
fatally injured,
local hospital,

When a

it was found that 3 had been

another 5 were in serious condition at a
and 2 persons were released from the emer

gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur
der and manslaughter.

He was detained by the police and is

now under security at the state prison.

The filmclip that

you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between
Mike and his lawyer, John Gordon.

They are preparing for a

Excuses and Responsibility
68

Mik e’s first court

appearance by reviewing the kinds

of

questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what
happened and also review some of the questions
asked.

you’ll be

One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a

description about what happened.

Tell me again what you’ll

say, as if you are talking to the judge.
Johnson:
As I am sure you all know,
occured,

on the day that the shootings

I was contacted by the People's Liberation Front

and told that if I did not conform exactly to their specifi
cations they would have one of their members bomb my house.
The man on the phone said that this action was forced upon
them by the backward policies of the university.

The school

had cut off funding to the group and removed their status as
a campus

organization.

They told me that I should climb

onto the roof of classroom building
shoot at the passing crowds.

(A) at twelve noon and

I thought it was a joke, until

someone showed up at the house about 11 AM. When I opened
the door, he forced his way into the house and told me that
he had come to escort me to classroom building (A).

He then

Excuses and Responsibility

69

pulled a pistol on me and forced me to get into his car.
drove me to the building,

He

got a suitcase out of the trunk,

and led me up to the roof.

After giving me the suitcase, he

told me that it contained a high power gun.
locking the door to the roof behind him.

He then left,

It was obvious to

me that I had no choice left but to do as he said.
Gordon:
Okay,

that's good.

Now for some of the questions that the

prosecution is bound to ask.
Have you had any connection with the People's

Liberation

Front before?
Johnson:
NO!,

of course not.

I didn't even know that they were in

existence until they started calling me.
Gordon:
Wait a minute,wait a.minute. You are implying that they have
called you several times.

Do you want to make that public

knowledge?
Johnson:
Well -- no, but they had called me several times before.
G:
Well then,

if you don't want them to know,

you shouldn't

give any hint that you’ve been contacted before.

I think

that you should place stress on the fact that the front's
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choice of you was arbitrary.
spokesman

from the People's

Be sure you tell them that.
Liberation Front has

A

already

relased a press statement to that effect and you should be
sure to not contradict it.
J:
Do you think I want to?
arbitrary.

I know that their choice of me was

I used to not know they existed and don't know

much more now - don't want to know anymore.
G:
Alright, what about the statements that you were 'retaliat
ing at the university'? Are those true?
J:
Well,

I wish

I had thought of doing

something like that.

The bastards in the administration need something to shake
them u p .
G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I was fired without reason.
And I'm not sure people would believe me if I said I wanted
to do it.

I had thought about it - really.

Maybe now some

body will wonder why I was fired.
G:
Nope.

Noone wants to know.

Besides,

the prosecution isn't

Excuses and Responsibility

71

looking to portray you as a victim of the school, they would
rather show you as an accomplice of a terrorist group.
J:
Alright,

alight,

so I ’ve never thought of shooting people

for any reason and I can’t make jokes to the court.
G:
That’s right.
timony.

It won't seem like a joke when it becomes tes

What about the possibility that you could have

called the police to get you out of the situation.
J:
Well I sure couldn’t call the cops when the man had a pistol
to by back!

Besides,

I thought

it was

a joke until he

showed u p .
G:
But you still didn’t have to start shooting, you could have
avoided that.
J:
How? And have my house blown to bits? These guys were seri
ous !
G:
Surely you value other people’s lives more than you do your
house?
J:
Yeah, sure I do, but I was under pressure then.

I had just

Excuses and Responsibility

72

spent

fourty five minutes with a gun pointed at m e .

I

didn't have time to think.
G:
Okay,

just make sure the court realizes the extent of the

pressure that you were under.

(looks at watch)

Its time.

All you need to do is be calm and answer the questions as
honestly as possible.

If someone asks a dangerous question,

I '11 catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Coercion, High Strength, Low Intention
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen
tral State University.
days later,

Mike was fired from his job, and two

in what some have described as "an attempt to

retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into
the crowds of students

changing classes.

He kept up

a

steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa
tion.

At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with

the SWAT team.

Twenty tense minutes passed while the police

cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic
tims.

Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears.

toll was taken of the damage,
fatally injured,
local hospital,

When a

it was found that 3 had been

another 5 were in serious condition at a
and 2 persons were released from the emer

gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur
der and manslaughter.

He was detained by the police and is

now under security at the state prison.

The filmclip that

you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between
Mike and his lawyer,

John Gordon.

They are preparing for
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Mike’s first court

appearance by reviewing the kinds

of

questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what
happened and also review some of the questions
asked.

you'll be

One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a

description about what happened.

Tell me again what you'll

say, as if you are talking to the judge.
Johnson:
As I am sure you all know,
occured,

on the day that the shootings

I was contacted by the People's Liberation Eront

and told that Melissa, my wife, had been kidnapped.
that

He said

I was to do exactly as they said or she would be

killed.

At first I didn't believe them.

was a sick joke by someone.

I thought that it

Then Melissa spoke with me on

the phone and assured me they were serious.

I was sure it

was her because she told me some things that only we two are
supposed to know.

Then the man grabbed the phone from her

and told me that if I ever wanted to see her again,
not call the police and do exactly as he said.
to wait for someone to show up at my house.

I would

He told me
That person

would take me to the roof of classroom building(A)

and sup-
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ply me with a gun.
crowds below.

I was to use the gun to fire on the

The man on the phone said that this action

was forced upon them by the backward policies of the univer
sity.

The

school had cut off funding to the

group and

removed their status as a campus organization.
nothing I could do but wait.

There was

About 11 AM someone drove up

in the driveway and walked to the door.

When I opened the

door, he forced his way into the house and told me that he
had come to escort me to classroom building (A).

He then

pulled a pistol on me and forced me to get into his car.
drove me to the building,

He

got a suitcase out of the trunk,

and led me up to the roof.

After giving me the suitcase, he

told me that it contained a high power gun.
locking the door to the roof behind him.
me that if I wanted to see my wife again,

He then left,

It was obvious to
I had no choice

left but to do as he said.
Gordon:
Okay,

that's good.

Now for some of the questions that the

prosecution is bound to ask.
Have you had any connection with the People's

Liberation

Front before?
Johnson:
NO!,

of course not.

I didn't even know that they were in

existence until they started calling me.
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Gordon:
Wait a minute,wait a minute. You are implying that they have
called you several times.

Do you want to make that public

knowledge?
Johnson:
Well -- no, but they had called me several times before.
G:
Well then,

if you d o n ’t want them to know,

you shouldn't

give any hint that you've been contacted before.

I think

that you should place stress on the fact that the front's
choice of you was arbitrary.

Be sure you tell them that.

spokesman from the People's Liberation Front has

A

already

relased a press statement to that effect and you should be
sure to not contradict it.
J:
Do you think I want to?
arbitrary.

I know that their choice of me was

I used to not know they existed and don't know

much more now - don't want to know anymore.
G:
Alright, what about the statements that you were 'retaliat
ing at the university'? Are those true?
J:
Oh come on! Of course not.
those people

I wouldn't think of shooting all

just to get back at the

administration.

If
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anything,
G:

I'd shoot an administrator.

(quickly)

You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah,

right.

But everybody knows I wouldn't do

something

like that.
G:
Nope. Everyone doesn't know.

Besides, the prosecution isn't

looking to portray you as a nice guy,

they want a convic

tion .
J:
so I've never thought of shooting people
for any reason and I can't make jokes to the court.
G:
That’s right.
timony.

What

It won't seem like a joke when it becomes tes
about the possibility that you could have

called the police to get you out of the situation.
J:
Well I sure couldn't call the cops when the man had a pistol
to by back!
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have
avoided that.
J:
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How? And have my my wife killed? These guys were serious!
G:
That's a hard choice, but couldn't you have tried to miss
everyone?
J:
Yeah, sure I could have, but the guy told me I was supposed
to hit people

--

if I hadn't.

Besides, I had just spent 45 minutes with a

gun at my back,

was under too much pressure to spend a lot

of time thinking.

they wouldn't have given me my wife back

And

I'm not a good shot - I had

tohit

someone and Icouldn't control where I hit them.
G:
Okay,

just make sure the court realizes the extent of the

pressure that you were under.

(looks at watch)

Its time.

All you need to do is be calm and answer the questions as
honestly as possible.

If someone asks a dangerous question

I'll catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Coercion, High Strength, High Intention
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen
tral State University.
days later,

Mike was fired from his job, and two

in what some have described as "an attempt to

retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into
the crowds of students

changing classes.

He kept up a

steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa
tion.

At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with

the SWAT team.

Twenty tense minutes passed while the police

cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic
tims.

Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears.

toll was taken of the damage,
fatally injured,

When a

it was found that 3 had been

another 5 were in serious condition at a

local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur
der and manslaughter.

He was detained by the police and is

now under security at the state prison.

The filmclip that

you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between
Mike and his lawyer,

John Gordon.

They are preparing for
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Mik e’s first court

appearance by reviewing the kinds

of

questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what
happened and also review some of the questions
asked.

you’ll be

One of the first things I ’ll ask you is to give a

description about what happened.

Tell me again what you'll

say, as if you are talking to the judge.
Johnson:
As I am sure you all know,
occured,

on the day that the shootings

I was contacted by the People’s Liberation Front

and told that Melissa, my wife, had been kidnapped.
that

He said

I was to do exactly as they said or she would be

killed.

At first I didn't believe them.

was a sick joke by someone.

I thought that it

Then Melissa spoke with me on

the phone and assured me they were serious.

I was sure it

was her because she told me some things that only we two are
supposed to know.

Then the man grabbed the phone from her

and told me that if I ever wanted to see her again,
not call the police and do exactly as he said.
to wait for someone to show up at my house.

I would

He told me
That person

would take me to the roof of classroom building(A)

and sup-
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ply me with a gun.
crowds below.

I was to use the gun to fire on the

The man on the phone said that this action

was forced upon them by the backward policies of the univer
sity.

The

school had cut off funding to the group

removed their status as a campus organization.
nothing I could do but wait.

and

There was

About 11 AM someone drove up

in the driveway and walked to the door.

When I opened the

door, he forced his way into the house and told me that he
had come to escort me to classroom building (A).

He then

pulled a pistol on me and forced me to get into his car.
drove me to the building,

He

got a suitcase out of the trunk,

and led me up to the roof.

After giving me the suitcase, he

told me that it contained a high power gun.
locking the door to the roof behind him.
me that if I wanted to see my wife again,

He then left,

It was obvious to
I had no choice

left but to do as he said.
Gordon:
Okay,

that's good. Now for some of the questions that the

prosecution is bound to ask.
Have you had any connection with the People's

Liberation

Front before?
Johnson:
NO!,

of course not.

I didn't even know that they were in

existence until they started calling me.
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Gordon:
Wait a minute,wait a minute. You are implying that they have
called you several times.

Do you want to make that public

knowledge?
Johnson:
Well -- no, but they had called me several times before.
G:
Well then,

if you don't want them to know,

you shouldn't

give any hint that you've been contacted before.

I think

that you should place stress on the fact that the front's
choice of you was arbitrary.

Be sure you tell them that.

spokesman from the Poeple's Liberation Front has

A

already

relased a press statement to that effect and you should be
sure to not contradict it.
J:
Do you think I want to?
arbitrary.

I know that their choice of me was

I used to not know they existed and don't know

much more now - don't want to know anymore.
G:
Alright, what about the statements that you were 'retaliat
ing at the university'? Are those true?
J:
Well,

I wish

I had thought of doing

something like that.

The bastards in the administration need something to shake
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them u p .
G: (quickly)
You d o n ’t want to say that either.
J:
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I was fired without reason.
And I'm not sure people would believe me if I said I wanted
to do it.

I had thought of it - really.

Maybe now somebody

will wonder why I was fired.
G:
Nope.

Noone wants to know.

Besides,

the prosecution isn't

looking to portray you as a victim of the school, they would
rather show you as an accomplice of a terrorist group.
J:
so I ’ve never thought of shooting people
for any reason and I can’t make jokes to the court.
G:
That’s right.
timony.

What

It w o n ’t seem like a joke when it becomes tes
about the possibility that you could have

called the police to get you out of the situation.
J:
Well I sure couldn't call the cops when the man had a pistol
to by back!
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have
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avoided that.
J:
How? And have my my wife killed? These guys were serious!
G:
That’s a hard choice,

but couldn’t you have tried to miss

everyone?
J:
Yeah, sure I could have, but the guy told me I was supposed
to hit people

--

they wouldn't have given me my wife back

if I hadn ’t.

Besides, I had just spent 45 minutes

with a

gun at my back, was under too much pressure to spend a lot
of time thinking.
someone and I

And

I'm not a good shot - I had to hit

couldn’tcontrol where I hit them.

G:
Okay,

just make sure the court realizes the extent of the

pressure that you were under.

(looks at watch)

Its time.

All you need to do is be calm and answer the questions as
honestly as possible.

If someone asks a dangerous question,

I'll catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)

Excuses and Responsibility

85

Insanity, Low strength, High Intention
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen
tral State University.
days later,

Mike was fired from his job, and two

in what some have described as "an attempt to

retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into
the crowds of

students changing classes.

He kept up

a

steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa
tion.

At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with

the SWAT team.

Twenty tense minutes passed while the police

cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic
tims.

Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears.

toll was taken of the damage,
fatally injured,

When a

it was found that 3 had been

another 5 were in serious condition at a

local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur
der and manslaughter.

He was detained by the police and is

now under security at the state prison.

The filmclip that

you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between
Mike and his lawyer,

John Gordon.

They are preparing for
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Mike's

first court appearance by reviewing the kinds of

questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what
happened and also review some of the questions
asked.

you'll be

One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a

description about what happened.

Tell me again what you'll

say, as if you are talking to the judge.
Johnson:
As I am sure you all know, just a few days before the shoot
ings occured,

I was fired from my job.

destroyed by this unjust action,
deep depression.

My entire career was

and I was

I did nothing for an entire day and would

neither eat nor sleep.

My wife could do nothing with me and

told me I should go see a psychiatrist.
morning of the shootings.

11 AM that I finally broke.
going to the gun cabinet.

break occured.

That was on the

It appeared to me as though my

entire life had gone down the drain.

commit suicide.

thrown into a

I guess it was about

I don't remember much except
I had at that time intended to

I must have been at that moment that the
I am told that I drove my car to classroom

building (A) and, hiding the gun, mounted the stairs to the
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roof.

It was when I heard the man from the police talking

to me that I realized what I was doing and threw down my
gun.

It took me several minutes after that to see that the

door to the roof was locked.
and let the police in.

I then went over to the door

As you can see from this description

of the facts, I was not aware of the actions I performed.
Gordon:
Okay,

that's good. Now for some of the questions that the
\

prosecution is bound to ask.
What about the statements that you were 'retaliating at the
university1? Are those true?
J:
Well,

I wish

I had thought of doing

something like that.

The bastards in the administration need something to shake
them u p .
G:

(quickly)

You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I was fired without reason.
And I ’m not sure people would believe me if I said I wanted
to do it.

I had thought about it - really.

Maybe now some

body will wonder why I was fired.
G:

Nope.

Noone wants to know.

Besides,

the prosecution isn't
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looking to portray you as a victim of the school, they would
rather show you as a scheming psychopath who likes to shoot
people.
J:
So I've never thought of shooting people
for any reason and I can’t joke with the press.
G:
That’s right.
timony.

It won't seem like a joke when it becomes tes

What about the possibility that you could have

called a doctor or a psychiatrist to get you out of the
situation?
J:
Well I sure couldn't call a doctor before I knew it would
happen.

And while it was happening I didn't know what I was

doing.
G:
But you still didn’t have to start shooting, you could have
avoided that.
J:
How? I told you that I wasn’t in control!
G:
You know

that,

but you

have

to convince

Surely you value other people's

these people.

lives enough that you could

realize that you were shooting at innocent people.
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J:
Yeah,

sure I value people's lives. But I was under so much

pressure about my financial situation that I couldn't think.
And when it all finally broke, I didn't have time to think.
G:
Okay,

just make sure the court realizes the extent of the

pressure that you were under.

(looks at watch)

Its time.

All you need to do is to be calm and answer the questions as
honestly as possible.

If someone asks a dangerous question,

I'll catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Insanity; Low Strength, Low Intention
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen
tral State University.
days later,

Mike was fired from his job, and two

in what some have described as "an attempt to

retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into
the crowds of students changing classes.

He kept up

a

steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa
tion.

At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with

the SWAT team.

Twenty tense minutes passed while the police

cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic
tims.

Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears.

toll was taken of the damage,
fatally injured,
local hospital,

When a

it was found that 3 had been

another 5 were in serious condition at a
and 2 persons were released from the emer

gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur
der and manslaughter.

He was detained by the police and is

now under security at the state prison.

The filmclip that

you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between
Mike and his lawyer,

John Gordon.

They are preparing for
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Mike’s first court appearance by reviewing the kinds of
questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what
happened and also review some of the questions
asked.

you’ll be

One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a

description about what happened.

Tell me again what you'll

say, as if you are talking to the judge.
Johnson:
As I am sure you all well know,
shootings occured,

I was

just a few days before the

fired from my job.

My entire

career was destroyed by this unjust action, and I was thrown
into a deep depression.

I did nothing for an entire day and

would neither eat nor sleep.

My wife could do nothing with

me and told me I should go see a psychiatrist.
the morning of the shootings.
my entire

That was on

It appeared to me as though

life had gone down the drain.

I guess

it was

about 11 AM that I finally broke.

I don't remember much

except going

I had at

to the

gun cabinet.

intended to commit suicide.
that the break occured.
classroom building

(A)

that time

I must have been at that moment

I am told that I drove my car to
and, hiding the gun,

mounted the
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stairs to the roof.

It was when I heard the man from the

police talking to me that I realized what I was doing and
threw down my gun.

It took me several minutes after that to

see that the door to the roof was locked.
to the door and let the police in.

I then went over

As you can see from this

description of the facts, I was not aware of the actions I
performed.
Gordon:
Okay,

that's good. Now for some of the questions that the

press is bound to ask.
What about the statements that you were 'retaliating at the
university'? Are those true?
J:
Oh come on! Of course not.
those people
anything,

I wouldn't think of shooting all

just to get back at the

administration.

If

I ’d shoot an administrator.

G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah,

right.

But everybody knows I wouldn't do

something

like that.
G:
Nope. Everyone doesn't know.

Besides, the prosecution isn't

looking to portray you as a nice guy,

they want a convic-
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tion.
J:
Alight,

alright,

I ’ve never thought of shooting people for

any reason and that’s true! My friends would think it was a
joke if I told them I wanted to shoot anyone.
G:
That may be right.
testimony What

It won't seem like a joke when it becomes

about the possibility that you could have

called a doctor or a psychiatrist to get you out of the
situation?
J:
Well I sure couldn't call a doctor before I knew it would
happen.

And while it was happening I didn't know what I was

doing.
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have
avoided that.
J:
How? I told you that I wasn't in control!
G:
You know

that,

but you

have

to convince

these people.

Surely you value other people's lives enough that you could
realize that you were shooting at innocent people.
J:
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Yeah,

sure I value people's lives. But I was under so much

pressure about my financial situation that I couldn't think
And when it all finally broke,

I didn't have time to think.

G:
Okay,

just make sure the court realizes the extent of the

pressure that you were under.

(looks at watch)

Its time.

All you need to do is be calm and answer the questions as
honestly as possible.

If someone asks a dangerous question,

I'll catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Insanity, High Strength, Low Intent
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen
tral State University.
days later,

Mike was fired from his job, and two

in what some have described as "an attempt to

retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into
the crowds of

students changing classes.

He kept up a

steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa
tion.

At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with

the SWAT team.

Twenty tense minutes passed while the police

cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic
tims.

Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears.

toll was taken of the damage,
fatally injured,

When a

it was found that 3 had been

another 5 were in serious condition at a

local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur
der and manslaughter.

He was detained by the police and is

now under security at the state prison.

The filmclip that

you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between
Mike and his lawyer,

John Gordon.

They are preparing for
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Mike's

first court

appearance by reviewing the kinds of

questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what
happened and also review some of the questions you' 11 be
asked.

One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a

description about what happened.

Tell me again what you'll

say, as if you are talking to the judge.
Johnson:
As I am sure you all know, just a few days before the shoot
ings occured,

I was fired from my job.

destroyed by this unjust action,
deep depression.

My entire career was

and I was thrown into a

I did nothing for an entire day and would

neither eat nor sleep.

My wife could do nothing with me and

told me I should go see a psychiatrist.
morning of the shootings.

It appeared to me as though my

entire life had gone down the drain.
11 AM that I finally broke.
going to the gun cabinet.
commit suicide.
break occured.

That was on the

I guess it was about

I don't remember much except
I had at that time intended to

I must have been at that moment that the
I am told that I drove my car to classroom

building (A) and, hiding the gun, mounted the stairs to the
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roof.

It was when I heard the man from the police talking

to me that I realized what I was doing and threw down my
gun.

It took me several minutes after that to see that the

door to the roof was locked.

I then went over to the door

and let the police in.
Gordon:
Okay,

that’s good. Now for some of the questions that the

press is bound to ask.
What about the statements that you were 'retaliating at the
university1? Are those true?
J:
Why, would I do that? Come on John.
shooting all those people.
them-no, noone.

I wouldn’t think of

all those kids-----

some of

An administrator?

G: (quickly)
You d o n ’t want to say that either.
J:
Yeah,

right.

But everybody knows I wouldn't do

something

like that.
G:
Nope. Everyone doesn't know.

Besides, the prosecution isn’t

looking to portray you as a nice guy,
tion .
J:

they want a convic
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Alright.

But I ’m making a joke - to poke fun -

a pun - but

its not.
G:
It w o n ’t seem like a joke when it becomes testimony.

What

about the possibility that you could have called a doctor or
a psychiatrist to get you out of the situation?
J:
Well sure _I couldn't call a doctor before I knew it would
happen.

And while I was happening I didn't know what I was

happening.
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have
avoided that.
J:
How?

I told you that I was happening! My me was doing it.

She was -G: (breaking in)
You know

that,

but you

have to convince

these people.

Surely you value other people's lives enough that you could
realize that you were shooting at innocent people.
J:
Yeah,

sure I value people's lives. But I was under so much

pressure about my me - my my - my, my, my- I couldn't think.
And when it all finally broke,

I didn't -- I don't-- have
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time to think.
G:
Okay,

just make sure the court realizes the extent of the

pressure that you were under.

(looks at watch)

Its time.

All you need to do is be calm and answer the questions as
honestly as possible.

If someone asks a dangerous question,

I ’ll before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Insanity, High Strength, High Intention
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen
tral State University.
days later,

Mike was fired from his job, and two

in what some have described as "an attempt to

retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into
the crowds of students changing classes.

He kept up a

steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa
tion.

At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with

the SWAT team.

Twenty tense minutes passed while the police

cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic
tims.

Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears.

toll was taken of the damage,
fatally injured,

When a

it was found that 3 had been

another 5 were in serious condition at a

local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur
der and manslaughter.

He was detained by the police and is

now under security at the state prison.

The filmclip that

you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between
Mike and his lawyer,

John Gordon.

They are preparing for
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Mike’s first court appearance by reviewing the kinds of
questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what
happened and also review some of the questions
asked.

you'll be

One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a

description about what happened.

Tell me again what you’ll

say, as if you are talking to the judge.
Johnson:
As I am sure you all well know,
shootings

occured,

I was

just a few days before the

fired from my job.

My entire

career was destroyed by this unjust action, and I was thrown
into a deep depression.

I did nothing for an entire day and

would neither eat nor sleep.

My wife could do nothing with

me and told me I should go see a psychiatrist.
the morning of the shootings.
my entire

That was on

It appeared to me as though

life had gone down the drain.

I guess

it was

about 11 AM that I finally broke.

I don't remember much

except going

I had at

to the

gun cabinet.

intended to commit suicide.
that the break occured.
classroom building

(A)

that time

I must have been at that moment

I am told that I drove my car to
and, hiding the gun,

mounted the
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stairs to the roof.

It was when I heard the man from the

police talking to me that I realized what I was doing and
threw down my gun.

It took me several minutes after that to

see that the door to the roof was locked.

I then went over

to the door and let the police in.
Gordon:
Okay,

that’s good. Now for some of the questions that the

prosecution is bound to ask.
What about the statements that you were ’retaliating at the
university'? Are those true?
J:
(this should be one of the few lucid statements)
Well,

I wish

I had thought of doing something like that.

The bastards in the administration need something to shake
them u p .
G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J: (psychosis should reassert itself here)
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I was fired without reason.
And I'm not sure people would believe me if I said I wanted
to do it.

I had thought about it - really I had.

Maybe now

somebody will wonder why I was fired - I'm tired- uh-wired.
G:
No, no, no. The prosecution isn’t looking to portray you as
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a victim of the school,

they would

rather show you as a

florid psychotic who wants to kill people.
J:
But I 1m making a j oke - to poke fun -

a pun - but

its not.
G:
It won't seem like a joke when it becomes testimony.

What

about the possibility that you could have called a doctor or
a psychiatrist to get you out of the situation?
J:
Well sure I_ couldn't call a doctor before I knew it would
happen.

And while I was happening I didn't know what I was

happening.
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have
avoided that.
J:
How?

I told you that I was happening!

My me was doing it.

She was -G: (breaking in)
You know

that,

but you

have

to convince

these people.

Surely you value other people's lives enough that you could
realize that you were shooting at innocent people.
J:
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Yeah,

sure I value people's lives. But I was under so much

pressure about my me - my my - my, my, my- I couldn't think.
And when it all finally broke,

I didn’t -- I don't-- have

time to think.
G:
Okay,

just make sure the court realizes the extent of the

pressure that you are under.
you

(looks at watch) Its time. All

need to do is be calm and answer the questions as hon

estly as possible.

If someone asks

a dangerous question,

I'll catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Drugs, Low Strength, High Intention
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen
tral State University.
days later,

Mike was fired from his job, and two

in what some have described as "an attempt to

retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into
the crowds of students

changing classes.

He kept up a

steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa
tion.

At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with

the SWAT team.

Twenty tense minutes passed while the police

cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic
tims.

Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears.

toll was taken of the damage,
fatally injured,

When a

it was found that 3 had been

another 5 were in serious condition at a

local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur
der and manslaughter.

He was detained by the police and is

now under security at the state prison.

The filmclip that

you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between
Mike and his lawyer,

John Gordon.

They are preparing for
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Mike's

first court appearance by reviewing the kinds of

questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what
happened and also review some of the questions you' 11 be
asked.

One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a

description about what happened.

Tell me again what you'll

say, as if you are talking to the judge.
JOHN:
As I am sure you all know, just a few days before the shoot
ings occured,

I was fired from my job.

My entire career was

destroyed by this

unjust

action,

and

deep depression.

I did

nothing

for an entire

wouldn't even eat.

I was thrown into a
day and

That was the day before the shootings.

It appeared to me

as

though my entirelife had gone downthe

drain.

to

get stoned so I could forget about it

I decided

for a while.

The drugs only exaggerated my depression.

I

felt worse than I had before and decided that my life wasn't
worth living.

I remember going to the gun cabinet.

at that time intended to commit suicide.
then that the I decided to act.

I had

It must have been

I drove my car to classroom

building (A) and, hiding the gun, mounted the stairs to the
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roof.

It was when I heard the man from the police talking

to me that I realized what I was doing and threw down my
gun.

It took me several minutes after that to see that the

door to the roof was locked.
and let the police in.
of the facts,

I then went over to the door

As you can see from this description

I was not fully aware of the actions I per

formed .
Gordon:
Okay,

that's good. Now for some of the questions that the

prosecution is bound to ask.
What about the statements that you were 'retaliating at the
university'? Are those true?
J:
Well,

I wish

I had thought of doing

something like that.

The bastards in the administration need something to shake
them up.
G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I was fired without reason.
And I'm not sure people would believe me if I said I wanted
to do it.

I had thought about it - really.

body will wonder why I was fired.
G:

Maybe now some
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Nope. Noone wants to know.

Besides,

the prosecution isn't

looking to portray you as a victim of the school, they would
rather show you as a drug addict that likes to shoot people.
J:
Alright,

alright, so I've never thought of shooting people

for any reason.. My friends would think it was a joke if I
told them I wanted to shoot anyone.
G:
That may be right.
testimony.

It won't seem like a joke when it becomes

What about the possibility that you could have

called a friend or someone to get you out of the situation?
J:
Well I sure couldn't call anyone before I knew it would hap
pen.

And while it was happening I didn't know what I was

doing.
G:
But you still didn't have.to start shooting, you could have
avoided that.
J:
How? I told you that I was stoned!
G:
You know

that,

but you

have to convince

these people.

Surely you value other people,' s lives enough that you could
realize that you were shooting at innocent people.
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J:
Yeah,

sure I value people's lives. But I was under so much

pressure about my financial situation that I couldn't think.
And when it all finally broke, I didn't have time to think.
G:
Okay,

just make sure the court realizes the extent of the

pressure that you were under.

(looks at watch)

Its time.

All you need to do is be calm and answer the questions as
honestly as possible.

If someone asks a dangerous question,

I'll catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Drugs, Low Strength, Low Intention
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen
tral State University.
days later,

Mike was fired from his job, and two

in what some have described as "an attempt to

retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into
the crowds of students changing classes.

He kept up a

steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa
tion.

At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with

the SWAT team.

Twenty tense minutes passed while the police

cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic
tims.

Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears.

toll was taken of the damage,
fatally injured,
local hospital,

When a

it was found that 3 had been

another 5 were in serious condition at a
and 2 persons were released from the emer

gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur
der and manslaughter.

He was detained by the police and is

now under security at the state prison.

The filmclip that

you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between
Mike and his lawyer,

John Gordon.

They are preparing for
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Mike's

first court, appearance by reviewing the kinds of

questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what
happened and also review some of the questions
asked.

you'll be

One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a

description about what happened.

Tell me again what you'll

say, as if you are talking to the judge.
JOHN:
As I am sure you all well know,
shootings occured,

I was

just a few days before the

fired from my job.

My entire

career was destroyed by this unjust action, and I was thrown
into a deep depression.
wouldn't even eat.

I did nothing for an entire day and

That was the day before the shootings.

It appeared to me as though my entire life had gone down the
drain.

I decide to get stoned so I could forget about it

for a while.

The drugs only exaggerated my depression.

I

felt worse than I had before and decided that my life wasn't
worth living.

I remember going to the gun cabinet.

at that time intended to commit suicide.
then that I decided to act.

I had

It must have been

I drove my car to classroom

building (A) and, hiding the gun, mounted the stairs to the
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roof.

It was when I heard the man from the police talking

to me that I realized what I was doing and threw down my
gun.

It took me several minutes after that to see that the

door to the roof was locked.
and let the police in.
of the facts,

I then went over to the door

As you can see from this description

I was not aware of the actions I performed and

should not be considered liable for those actions.
Gordon:
Okay,

that's good. Now for some of the questions that the

prosecution is bound to ask.
What about the statements that you were 'retaliating at the
university'? Are those true?
J:
Oh come on! Of course not.
those people
anything,

I wouldn't think of shooting all

just to get back at the administration.

If

I'd shoot an administrator.

G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah,

right.

But everybody knows I wouldn't do

something

like that.
G:
Nope. Everyone doesn't know.

Besides, the prosecution isn't

looking to portray you as a nice guy,

they want a convic-
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tion.
J:
Alright, alight,

I've never thought of shooting people for

any reason - and that's true. My friends would think it was
a joke if I told them I wanted to shoot anyone.
G:
That may be right.
testimony.

It won't seem like a joke when it becomes

What about the possibility that you could have

called a friend or someone to get you out of the situation?
J:
Well I sure couldn't call anyone before I knew it would hap
pen.

And while it was happening I didn't know what I was

doing.
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have
avoided that.
J:
How? I told you that I was stoned!
G:
You know

that,

but you

have

to convince

these people.

Surely you value other people's lives enough that you could
realize that you were shooting at innocent people.
J:
Yeah,

sure I value people's lives. But I was under so much
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pressure about my financial situation that I couldn't think
And when it all finally broke,

I didn't have time to think.

G:
Okay,

just make sure the court realizes the extent of the

pressure that you were under.

(looks at watch)

Its time.

All you have to do is be calm and answer the questions as
honestly as possible.

If someone

asks

a dongerous ques

tion, I'll catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Drugs, High Strength, Low Intention
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen
tral State University.
days later,

Mike was fired from his job, and two

in what some have described as "an attempt to

retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into
the crowds

of students

changing classes.

He kept up a

steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa
tion.

At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with

the SWAT team.

Twenty tense minutes passed while the police

cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic
tims.

Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears.

toll was taken of the damage,
fatally injured,

When a

it was found that 3 had been

another 5 were in serious condition at a

local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur
der and manslaughter.

He was detained by the police and is

now under security at the state prison.

The filmclip that

you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between
Mike and his lawyer,

John Gordon.

They are preparing for
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Mike's

first court appearance by reviewing the kinds of

questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what
happened and also review some of the questions
asked.

you'll be

One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a

description about what happened.

Tell me again what you'll

say, as if you are talking to the judge.
JOHN:
As I am sure you all know, just a few days before the shoot
ings occured,

I was fired from my job.

My entire career was

destroyed by this unjust action,

and I was thrown into a

deep depression.

for an entire

wouldn't even eat.

I did nothing

day and

That was the day before the shootings.

It appeared to me as though my entire life had gone down the
drain.

I decided to get stoned so I could forget about it

for a while.

The drugs

only exaggerated my depression.

Once I started I couldn't stop and I have no idea of the
amount or kind of drugs I took.
before

I felt worse than I had

and decided that my life wasn't worth living.

don't remember anything after going to the gun cabinet.
had at that time intended to commit suicide.

I
I

It must have
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been in that stupor that the break occured.
I drove my car to classroom building (A)
gun, mounted the stairs to the roof.

I am told that

and, hiding the

It was when I heard

the man from the police talking to me that I realized what I
was doing and threw down my gun.

It took me several minutes

after that to see that the door to the roof was locked.
then went over to the door and let the police in.

I

As you

can see from this description of the facts, I was not aware
of the actions I performed and should not be considered lia
ble for those actions.
Gordon:
Okay,

that’s good. Now for some of the questions that the

prosecution is bound to ask.
What about the statements that you were 'retaliating at the
university'? Are those true?
J:
Oh come on! Of course not.
those people
anything,

I wouldn't think of shooting all

just to get back at the

administration.

If

I'd shoot an administrator.

G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah,

right.

like that.

But everybody knows I wouldn't do something
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G:
Nope. Everyone doesn't know.

Besides, the prosecution isn't

looking to portray you as a nice guy,

they want a convic

tion .
J:

/

I've never thought of shooting people for
any reason - and that's true. My friends would think it was
a joke if I told them I wanted to shoot anyone.
G:
That may be right.
testimony.

It won't seem like a joke when it becomes

What about the possibility that you could have

called a friend or someone to get you out of the situation?
JrWell I sure couldn't call anyone before I knew it would hap
pen.

And while it was happening I didn't know what I was

doing.
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have
avoided that.
J:
How? I told you that I wasn't in control!
G:
You know

that,

but you have

to convince

these people.

Surely you value other people's lives enough that you could
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realize that you were shooting at innocent people.
J:
Yeah,

sure I value people’s lives. But I was under so much

pressure about my financial situation that I couldn’t think
And with all those drugs in me I didn't have time to think.
G:
Okay,

just make sure the court realizes the extent of the

pressure that you were under.

(looks at watch)

Its time.

All you have to do is be calm and answer the questions as
honestly as possible.

If anyone asks a dangerous question,

I '11 catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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Drugs, High Strength, High Intention
Commentator:
A week ago, Mike Johnson was a computer programmer for Cen
tral State University.
days later,

Mike was fired from his job, and two

in what some have described as "an attempt to

retaliate at the school", climbed atop one of the classroom
buildings of the University at noon and began firing into
the crowds of students changing classes.

He kept up

a

steady rate of fire for 10 minutes until a local SWAT team
arrived and the negotiator began to engage him in conversa
tion.

At this point he ceased fire and began to talk with

the SWAT team.

Twenty tense minutes passed while the police

cleared the area and the ambulances took care of the vic
tims.

Finally, Mike Johnson surrendered in tears.

toll was taken of the damage,
fatally injured,

When a

it was found that 3 had been

another 5 were in serious condition at a

local hospital, and 2 persons were released from the emer
gency room after treatment for minor flesh wounds.
Mike is being charged with multiple counts of both mur
der and manslaughter.

He was detained by the police and is

now under security at the state prison.

The filmclip that

you are about to see is a portion of a discussion between
Mike and his lawyer,

John Gordon.

They are preparing for
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Mike’s first court

appearance by reviewing the kinds of

questions that the prosecution will be sure to ask.
Gordon:
OK, Mike, its almost time for us to go to the courtroom, but
we have enough time to go over your testimony about what
happened and also review some of the questions you’ll be
asked.

One of the first things I'll ask you is to give a

description about what happened.

Tell me again what you’ll

say, as if you are talking to the judge.
JOHN:
As I am sure you all know, just a few days before the shoot
ings occured,

I was fired from my job.

My entire career was

destroyed by this

unjust

action,

and I was thrown into

deep depression.

I did

nothing

for an entire

wouldn’t even eat.

a

day and

That was the day before the shootings.

It appeared to me

as

though my entire

drain.

to

get stoned so I could forget about it

I decided

for a while.

life had gone downthe

The drugs only exaggerated my depression.

Once I started I couldn't stop and I have no idea of the
amount or kind of drugs I took.
before

I felt worse than I had

and decided that my life wasn't worth living.

don't remember anything after going to the gun cabinet.
had at that time intended to commit suicide.

I
I

It must have
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been in that stupor that the break occured.
I drove my car to classroom building (A)
gun, mounted the stairs to the roof.

I am told that

and, hiding the

It was when I heard

the man from the police talking to me that I realized what I
was doing and threw down my gun.

It took me several minutes

after that to see that the door to the roof was locked.
then went over to the door and let the police in.

I

As you

can see from this description of the facts, I was not aware
of the actions I performed and should not be considered lia
ble for those actions.
Gordon:
Okay,

that's good. Now for some of the questions that the

prosecution is bound to ask.
What about the statements that you were 'retaliating at the
university'? Are those true?
J:
Well,

I wish

I had thought of doing something like that.

The bastards in the administration need something to shake
them u p .
G: (quickly)
You don't want to say that either.
J:
Yeah, right. But everybody knows I was fired without reason.
And I'm not sure people would believe me if I said I wanted
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to do it.

I had thought about it - really.

Maybe now some

body will wonder why I was fired.
G:
Nope. Noone wants to know.

Besides,

the prosecution isn't

looking to portray you as a victim of the school, they would
rather show you as a drug addict who likes to shoot people.
J:
Albright,

alright,

so I've never thought of shooting people

for any reason. And I can't make jokes in court.
G:
That's right.
timony.

It won't seem like a joke when it becomes tes

What about the possibility that you could have

called a friend or someone to get you out of the situation?
J:
Well I sure couldn't call anyone before I knew it would hap
pen.

And while it was happening I didn't know what I was

doing.
G:
But you still didn't have to start shooting, you could have
avoided that.
J:
How? I told you that I wasn't in control!
G:
You know

that,

but you

have to convince

these people.
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Surely you value other people's lives enough that you could
realize that you were shooting at innocent people.
J:
Yeah,

sure I value people's lives. But I was under so much

pressure about my financial situation that I couldn't think.
And with all those drugs in me I couldn't think.
G:
Okay,

just make sure the court realizes the extent of the

pressure that you were under.

(looks at watch)

Its time.

All you have to do is be calm and answer the questions as
honestly as possible.

If anyone asks a dangerous question,

I '11 catch it before you have to say anything.
(They both get up and walk out the door of the office.)
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APPENDIX B

Dependent Variables for Coerced Condition
How much influence did Mike's fear of what the terrorists would do
have over Mike's actions?
No Influence
at all

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Extreme!
Influence

How likely is it that Mike intended to do what he did?
Not at all
Likely

:

:

:

:

:

:

;

:

Extremely
Likely

How possible is it that Mike: could have done something other than shoot
the people?
Not at all
Possible

:

:

:

:

:

Extremely
Possible

:

How free was Mike to decide to shoot the people?
Not at all
Free

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Extremely
Free

How morally responsible was Mike for shooting the people?
Not at all
Responsible

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Extremely
Responsible

How legally responsible was Mike for shooting the people?
Not at all
Responsible

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Extremely
Responsible
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How probable is it that Mike would do the same sort of thing again?
Not at all ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ Extremely
Probable
Probable
If you were a

jury member,

how likely would you be to convict Mike?

Not at all ____:____ :___ :_____ :____ :____ :_____:_____:___ Extremely
Likely
Likely
How severe a sentence would you recommend for Mike?
Not at all ____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :_____ Extremely
Severe
Severe
How responsible do you think Mike feels for shooting the people?
Not at all ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ Extremely
Responsible
Responsible
Assuming that Mike had not been at all afraid of the terrorists, what
the likelihood that Mike would have shot the people anyway?
Not at all ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :_____ Extremely
Likely
Likely
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Dependent Variables for Drugs Condition
How much influence did the drugs Mike took actually
have over Mike's actions?
No influence ____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ Extremely Much
at all
Influence
How likely is it that Mike intended to do what he did?
Not at all
Likely

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Extremely
Likely

How possible is it that Mike could have done something other than shoot
the people?
Not at all
Possible

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Extremely
Possible

;

Extremely
Free

How free was Mike to decide to shoot the people?
Not at all
Free

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

How morally responsible was Mike for shooting the people?
Not at all
Responsible

:

:

:

:

:

:

;

Extremely
Responsible

How legally responsible was Mike for shooting the people?
Not at all
Responsible

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Extremely
Responsible

How probable is it that Mike would do the same sort of thing again?
Not at all ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ Extremely
Probable
.
Probable
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If you were a jury member, how likely would you be to convict Mike?
Not at all ____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ Extremely
Likely
Likely
How severe a sentence would you recommend for Mike?
Not at all ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :__________
Severe

:____ Extremely
Severe

How responsible do you think Mike feels for shooting the people?
Not at all ____:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ Extremely
Responsible
Responsible
Assuming that Mike had not taken any drugs at all, what is the
likelihood that Mike would have shot the people anyway?
Not at all ____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____
Likely

Extremely
Likely
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Dependent Variables for Insane Condition
How much influence did Mike's emotional instability actually
have over Mike's actions?
No Influence _________ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ Extremely Much
at all
Influence
How likely is it that Mike intended to do what he did?
Not at all ___ :____ :_____:____ :___ :_____:____ :____ :____ Extremely
Likely
Likely
How possible is it that Mike could have done something other than shoot
the people?
Not at all ___ :____ :_____:____ :___ :_____:____ :____ :____ Extremely
Possible
Possible
How free was Mike to decide to shoot the people?
Not at_all ____:
Free

:_____:____ :___ :_____:____ :____ :____ Extremely
Free

How morally responsible was Mike for shooting the people?
Not at all ____:_____
Responsible

:____ :____ :_____:____ :_____:____ Extremely
Responsible

How legally responsible was Mike for shooting the people?
Not at all ____:____ :_____:____ :___ :_____:____ :____ :____ Extremely
Responsible
Responsible
How probable is it that Mike would do the same sort of thing again?
Not at all ____:____ :_____:____ :___ :_____:____ :____ :____ Extremely
Probable
Probable
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If you were a

jury member,

how likely would you be to convict Mike?

Not at all ____ :____ :____:_____ :____ :_____ :____:_____:___ Extremely
Likely
Likely
How severe a sentence would you recommend for Mike?
Not at all ____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :_____ Extremely
Severe
Severe
How responsible do you think Mike feels for shooting the people?
Not at all
Responsible

:____ :_____

:____ :____ :____ :____ Extremely
Responsible

Assuming that Mike had not been at all emotionaly unstable, what is the
likelihood that Mike would have shot the people anyway?
Not at all ____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____ :____
Likely

Extremely
Likely

